Innovators,” press release, Nov. 6, 2014, www.prnewswire
.com; and Interbrand, “Best Global Brands 2014,” n.d.,
www.rankingthebrands.com. For more on the need for
Chinese firms to strategically transform, see the Chinese
edition of M. Hensmans, G. Johnson, and G. Yip, ”Strategic
Transformation,” originally published in Basingstoke,
United Kingdom, by Palgrave Macmillan in 2013 and
published in Beijing in 2015 by China Machine Press.
6. F.A. Martínez-Jerez, “Rewriting the Playbook for Corporate Partnerships,” MIT Sloan Management Review 55,
no. 2 (winter 2014): 63-70.
7. P. Phan, J. Zhou, and E. Abrahamson, “Creativity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship in China,” Management and
Organization Review 6, no. 2 (2010): 175-194.
8. J.B. Starr, “Continuing the Revolution: The Political
Thought of Mao” (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2015); and C.S.C. Hawes, “The Chinese
Transformation of Corporate Culture” (Abingdon, United
Kingdom: Routledge, 2012).
9. C.A. Anderson, “Attributional Style, Depression, and
Loneliness: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of American
and Chinese Students,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25, no. 4 (April 1999): 482-499; and
K. Leung, “Beliefs in Chinese Culture,” in “The Oxford
Handbook of Chinese Psychology,” ed. M.H. Bond
(Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2010),
10. Y. Zhou, W. Lazonick, and Y. Sun, eds., “Introduction:
China’s Transformation Into Innovation-Nation,” in
“China as an Innovation Nation” (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016).
11. C. Dongsheng and L. Lili, “Huawei Zhengxiang [The
Truth About Huawei]” (Beijing: Xiandai Zhongguo Chuban-she, 2003), 5; T. Tao and W. Chunbo, “The Huawei Story”
(Mountain View, California: Sage Publications, 2014); L.V.
Gerstner Jr., “Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance? Inside
IBM’s Historic Turnaround” (New York City: HarperBusi-ness 2002); and M. Lagace, “Gerstner: Changing Culture
at IBM — Lou Gerstner Discusses Changing the Culture
at IBM,” Dec. 9, 2002, http://hbswk.hbs.edu.
12. In a 2012 interview, John Lord, chairman of Huawei’s
Australian division, described its approach: “We’re developing a model and once that model is mature, that model
will be exported to other regions and countries around the
world.” See “China’s Huawei Vows to Become More
Transparent,” Oct. 24, 2012, www.reuters.com.
13. “Huawei Technologies Has Been Selected by
Dutch Operator Telfort B.V. for Its UMTS Roll-Out,”
news release, Dec. 9, 2004, http://pr.huawei.com.
14. This was part of a policy of offering extremely high
rebates (anywhere from 35% up to 95%) in return for
a long-term relationship. Huawei’s top management
initially came to Europe to personally offer discounts
to potential customers. This practice was considered
illegitimate by leading European customers, however,
as well as proof of the low-quality, “imitation” reputation
of Chinese technology companies. Huawei subsequently
hired local account managers. Based on their input, the
company ended its discount practices and upgraded its
price offering to be in line with European expectations
of a quality offering.
15. According to the companies’ annual reports, Huawei
has outspent its main European competitors of Ericsson,
Nokia, and Alcatel-Lucent in absolute terms since 2010,
beating Ericsson even in relative percentage terms since
2015. Nevertheless, Huawei obtains an increasingly large
share of its revenues from the less R&D-intensive B2C
segment of smartphones.
16. T. Wei, Huawei Technologies vice president of
delivery management, interview with the author,
Jan. 10, 2015.
17. Ericsson executive, interview with the author,
June 5, 2015.
18. See, for example, J. Cherry, “Korean Multinationals in
Europe” (Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 2001);
and M. Mason and D. Encarnation, eds., “Does Ownership
Matter?: Japanese Multinationals in Europe” (Oxford,
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1994). On
lobbying and localization of personnel, see Y. Hamada,
“The Impact of the Traditional Business–Government
Relationship on the Europeanization of Japanese Firms,”
Journal of European Public Policy 14, no. 3 (April 2007):
19. R. Ding, “Open Innovation for a Better Connected
World,” November 2015, www.huawei.com; and C.
Gnam, “Munich Becomes Europe’s Leading Hub for Io T,”
Invest in Bavaria (blog), March 21, 2016, www.invest-in-bavaria.com.
20. “Beijing Considers Hungary Bridgehead to
Europe, Says Chinese Formin,” Oct. 29, 2014,
21. “Hungarian PM Welcomes Upgrade to Huawei
Logistics Center,” Dec. 3, 2013, www.chinadaily.com.
22. Sénat, “Rapport d’information de M. Jean-Marie
Bockel, fait au nom de la commission des affaires
étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées,”
July 18, 2012, www.senat.fr.
23. See, for example, “The Company That Spooked
the World,” The Economist, Aug. 4, 2012; and M. Kan,
“China’s Huawei and ZTE Grilled by U.S. Committee Over
Spying Concerns,” Sept. 14, 2012, www.pcworld.com.
24. S.R. Weisman, “Sale of 3Com to Huawei Is
Derailed by U.S. Security Concerns,” The New York
Times, Feb. 21, 2008.
25. M. Kan, “China’s Huawei to Reverse Controversial
Deal for 3Leaf,” Feb. 19, 2011, www.pcworld.com.
26. L. Lucas, “Huawei’s Smartwatch Tries to Win the
West,” Financial Times, Sept. 26, 2016.
27. B. Grubb, “Telcos Could Face Huawei Ban, Malcolm
Turnbull Confirms,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 27,
2015; and A. Coyne, “Australian MPs Still Scared of
Huawei,” Oct. 17, 2016, www.itnews.com.au.
i. See also M. Hensmans and G. Liu, “How Do the
Normativity of Headquarters and the Knowledge
Autonomy of Subsidiaries Co-Evolve?” iCite working
paper WP2016-020, Universite Libre de Bruxelles,
Bruxelles, Belgium, Oct. 11, 2016, https://ideas.repec.org.
Reprint 58219. For ordering information, see page 4.
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